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TORTS
FRANK A. BUCHANAN of the Boulder Bar

During the past year the Colorado Supreme Court has written
opinions in a variety of fact situations 'involving the application
of the law of torts, including a case for malicious prosecution, two
malpractice suits, suits for libel, for civil conspiracy, and for fraud,
three cases considering falls on sidewalks and one a fall in a rest
room, an electrocution case, and eight cases arising out of automobile accidents, of which five were controlled by the Guest Statute.
Both cases against physicians for malpractice were reversed
in spite of the fact that in each case the plaintiff had obtained a
jury verdict in his favor. In Lamme v. Ortega,' the doctor's attorneys were able to persuade the appellate court that the plaintiff's
own testimony and his own witnesses failed to prove the facts he
alleged. The plaintiff had attempted to prove that he had been injured by the defendant's use of X-ray and fluoroscope machines
in probing for a bullet in his leg. The Supreme Court said that
the burden of proving a causal connection between the defendant's
acts and the alleged injury "is not met by showing that it might
have resulted from the operations complained of, and jurors should
not be left to conjecture as to the efficient and proximate cause."
In the other malpractice suit, Maercklein and Postma v.
Smith, 2 the plaintiff Smith and his wife had hired the defendants,
licensed physicians and surgeons, to perform a circumcision. Instead of the operation requested, a vasectomy was performed, rendering the plaintiff sterile and causing him to suffer in various
other ways enumerated in the complaint, to his damage. In July,
1953, the Supreme Court issued an opinion 3 dismissing the entire
suit on the grounds that more than one year had elapsed since the
"assault and battery" and therefore the action was barred by the
Statute of Limitations, 4 two judges dissenting. A rehearing was
granted, the original opinion withdrawn, and this opinion issued.
This time the Supreme Court dismissed the case only as to surgeon
Postma, who had been hired by the defendant Dr. Maercklein, the
general practitioner, on the grounds that surgeon Postma had performed the operation skillfully and had been assured by defendant
Maercklein that written consent by both the plaintiff and his wife
had been obtained. In actual fact, no written consent had been obtained. The Court remanded the case, ordering a new trial to
determine the liability of defendant Maercklein, ruling as follows:
(1) Where a different operation than that ordered is
performed, the action, regardless of the form of the pleading,
is one based in negligence and not assault and battery. The
1267 P. 2d 1175, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 10, p. 207.
2266 P. 2d 1095, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 9, p. 188.
' 1952-53 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 26, p. 416.
4 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 102, §2 (1935).
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two year Statute of Limitations,5 not the one year Statute, is
applicable.
(2) The trial court erred in permitting only the matter
of damages to be determined by the jury-holding that there
is no statute or rule of law requiring written consent to be
obtained before performing this or any other type of operation and that the terms of employment were here a disputed
question of fact, to be determined by the jury. Defendant
Maercklein's liability is determined by a jury's answer to the
question: What operation had the plaintiff's wife, as the plaintiff's agent, with the plaintiff's knowledge and consent, in
actual fact ordered-circumcision or sterilization? 6
In the malicious prosecution case, Montgomery Ward v. Pherson,7 the Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict, finding as a matter of law that the defendants had probable cause, acted without
malice, and were entitled to rely upon the advice of the district
attorney in instigating the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff.
The Court recognized the difficulty a jury has comprehending how
a person found innocent in the criminal proceeding may not be
able to recover. The Court ruled that where the facts are conceded
or substantially undisputed, probable cause is a question of law
for the trial court. In so stating, the Supreme Court observed
further as follows:
An innocent person may be prosecuted unjustly, and
subjected to the expense and disgrace incident thereto
with no right to call the prosecutor to account, provided
he acted upon an honest and reasonable belief in commencing the proceeding complained of. One may act on
what appears to be true, even if it turns out to be false,
provided he believes it to be true and the appearances
are sufficient to justify the belief as reasonable.
It is for the best interests of society that those who
offend against the laws of the state shall be promptly punished, and that any citizen who has reasonable grounds
to believe that the law has been violated shall have the
right to cause the arrest of the person whom he honestly
and in good faith believes to be the offender. For the purpose of protecting him in so doing, it is the generally established rule that if he has reasonable grounds for his
belief, and acts thereon in good faith in causing the arrest, he shall not be subjected to damages merely because
the accused is not convicted. The rule is founded on the
grounds of public policy in order to encourage the exposure of crime.
6 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 102, §7 (1935).
6 See also Bates v. Newman, 264 P. 2d 197, for unusual damage.
'272 P. 2d 643, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 15, p. 363.
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The Court also expressed the rule of law that it is a complete defense to such a suit if the criminal proceeding was advised by a
district attorney after a good faith, full afid fair disclosure of all
the facts had been made to him. In discussing this principle, the
Court stated as follows:
It is the common duty of every citizen to report to the
legally constituted authorities every violation of the law,
to the end that the law may be enforced; . . . if the complaining party states the facts fully and fairly to the
district attorney, and that officer incorrectly determines
that such facts constitute a crime, and proceeds to formulate the necessary papers to set on foot the prosecution,
the complaining party is not liable, since the fault is not
his, but that of the officer.
If the officers of the state, who are appointed on account of their legal learning, consider that a given state
of facts is sufficient evidence or probable cause, how can
a private citizen be said to be in fault in acting upon such
facts, and how can the state condemn him to damages for
so doing? To decide so is to use the machinery of government as a trap to ensnare those who trust in government
for such matters, and who ought to trust in it.
Hadden v. Gateway West Publishing Company 8 is the libel
suit. A past member of the now famous Board of Education of
Jefferson County tangled with the Jefferson Sentinel. In affirming
a jury verdict for the defendants, the Supreme Court declared that
irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent hearsay testimony, in order to be grounds for reversal, must also be shown to have been
prejudicial. Because of the special provisions of our State Constitution 9 concerning truth as a defense in suits for libel, the Court
ruled that a general denial to the allegations that the defendants
had published articles which were "false, defamatory, untrue and
libelous" included the defense that the matters published were true.
In Lockwood Grader Corporationv. Bockhaus,10 the defendant
asserted, in his answer to the plaintiff's suit to foreclose a mortgage securing an admitted debt, a counterclaim for actual and
exemplary damages resulting from the plaintiff's conspiracy to
force him out of business. Apparently, a soft hearted creditorplaintiff in effect financed the debtor defendant for a number of
years and became so entwined that he found it difficult to get
untangled. In fact, the jury found for the debtor--defendant on his
counterclaim, for $500.00 actual damages and $3,000.00 exemplary
damages. The Supreme Court failed to find any evidence to support the jury verdict, reversed it and stated that to constitute a
8 273 P. 2d 733, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 17, p. 437.
'COLO. CONST. Art. II, §10.
10270 P. 2d 193, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 13, p. 298.
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civil conspiracy, there must be (1) two or more persons (and for
this purpose a corporation is a person) ; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action;
(4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result thereof.
In Platte Valley Motor Company, Inc. v. Wayne," the plaintiffs, beet farmers, had purchased a beet harvesting machine which
they alleged would not harvest beets, and sued both the seller and
the manufacturer on the implied warranty that the machine was
reasonably suited for the purpose for which it was designed and
sold. The Supreme Court summarized the pleading of both defendants by saying that it was a case of the kettle calling the pot
black, and observed that the plaintiffs agreed with both defendants on this score. The Supreme Court found both the pot and the
kettle to be bla~k, for they reversed and remanded for a new trial
and ruled that under the Uniform Sales Act 12 both the distributor
and the manufacturer gave an implied warranty that goods are
reasonably fit for the purpose for which they are purchased. The
case is also authority that an amended complaint relates back to
the time of filing of the original complaint. The Statute of Limitations 13 does not bar a claim for damages for fraud and misrepresentation if the claim arose out of facts originally pleaded, even
though the statutory period elapsed since the happening of the
events giving rise thereto if, as in this case, the original complaint
had been filed within the period.
The most important of the sidewalk cases is Parker v. City
and County of Denver.14 In this case, the Supreme Court reversed
all of its prior decisions insofar as they may have established a
definite or mathematical rule as to the depth of a depression or
elevation in a sidewalk necessary to constitute actionable negligence against a municipality. The usual rules of negligence are
substituted for a mathematical formula, and it is stated that a
reasonably safe sidewalk is to be henceforth determined by the
amount of travel, the location of the depression or elevation, the
nature of the area, and any other circumstances of the particular
case, as well as the "measured" depth or elevation over which a
plaintiff may have stumbled. The decision was en bane, with
Mr. Justice Holland dissenting. As Justice Holland points out in
his dissenting opinion, the majority decision is not clear as to
whether or not a depression or elevation less than one and threeeighths inches remains as a matter of law not actionable. This
writer believes that the proper role of the jury and the usual principles of negligence have been restored to the sidewalk cases.
In Clark v. Joslin Dry Goods,'5 the second sidewalk case, the
1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 17, p. 433.
STAT. ANN., c. 143A, §15(1) (1935).
"COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 102, §6 (1935).
262 P. 2d 553, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 3, p. 52.
262 P. 2d 546, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 2, p. 37.
"COLO.
14
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Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's direction of a verdict for
the defendant, holding that a 61 year old person weighing 285
pounds, while using a cane and carrying bundles, suffering from
high blood pressure and other ailments, cannot recover for injuries
suffered from a fall on a sidewalk on which she had observed little
rivulets of waste water from the washing of display windows, as
follows:
When a person travels along a sidewalk which he
knows to be dangerous, he cannot recover for injuries sustained resulting from defects of which he had knowledge,
unless he exercises care commensurate with the danger
about to be encountered, and his ability to cope with it.
The precautions which an ordinary prudent person in the
full possession of his physical faculties would take to
avoid danger would be wholly insufficient to protect one
from the same danger whose physical faculties were impaired.
In the third sidewalk case, Beezley v. Olson, 16 the Court ruled
that a sidewalk trowelled to a smooth surface is not an inherently
dangerous and unsafe condition simply because a pedestrian slipped and fell thereon during snowy and icy conditions. The Court
observed that in these sidewalk cases not every defect is actionable
but depends entirely upon all the circumstances of the case. Since
only slight defects and obstructions in sidewalks are sometimes not
actionable, the Supreme Court did not wish to affirm a decision
which permitted a smooth sidewalk to be actionable unless it were
also shown that the sidewalk was slippery at all times and not just
when wet or covered with ice. Note, however, that this suit was
not based on the theory that the defendant was negligent in failing to remove the ice and snow, but rather on the theory that
the trowelled smooth sidewalk was an inherently dangerous and
unsafe condition.
In Van Schaack v. Perkins,17 the plaintiff, a member of the
fair sex and of our learned profession, slipped and fell in the rest
room in the building in which she maintained her professional
offices. The janitor had left green liquid soap on the floor, making
it slippery. The defendants claimed they could not be held liable
because they had no notice or knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the dangerous condition. The Supreme Court differentiated between those situations where a dangerous condition exists in a
public building through no act of the landlord (in which case the
landlord is held liable for a user's injury only when the landlord
had actual notice or knowledge of the dangerous condition or the
condition had existed for such a length of time that in law he is
21270 P. 2d 758, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 14, p. 326.
'

272 P. 2d 269, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 16, p. 392.
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charged with constructive notice thereof) and those situations,
as here, where an agent of the owner of the building negligently
created the dangerous condition. In this latter instance, no actual
knowledge or constructive notice is necessary for a plaintiff to recover, and the verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed.
Jackson v. Mountain Utilities Corporation18 is an interesting
case. A pole of a mountain transmission line rotted and fell, and
blocked the plaintiff's driveway with high voltage lines. The plaintiff lived to bring suit after being electrocuted while trying to attach a rope to the pole to raise the lines and unblock the driveway.
The trial court had set aside a jury verdict for the plaintiff and
entered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed and
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding that a plaintiff
cannot recover who was fully aware of the extreme danger surrounding contact with high voltage electrical wires, does not deny
that he had knowledge of the present danger, and while acting
under no emergency, assumed the risk. The Supreme Court further
held that the negligence of the defendant, that of failing to replace
a rotten pole, was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury,
when the plaintiff had observed the condition, assumed the risk,
and with full knowledge of the extreme danger nevertheless assumed to act. The Court found the plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
Many of the "friendly" suits now pending by a plaintiff guestpassenger to collect damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, allegedly caused by the wilful and wanton negligence of the owner-driver defendant, might just as well be dismissed with prejudice. In this past year the Supreme Court has
had occasion to consider five cases where a jury verdict had been
obtained for the guest-passenger. Four of the five were reversed.
The case of Pettingell v. Moede 19 provided an ideal fact situation for the Court to further construe the Guest Statute. The defendant was courting the plaintiff. She had accompanied him on
a hunting trip to the Western slope. While returning via Berthoud
Pass, the four wheel drive jeep equipped with snow tread tires
slipped off the road, injuring both parties. The plaintiff admitted
that the defendant was a careful driver and had not been drinking,
but asserted that driving 35 miles per hour on a slippery downgrade was wilful and wanton negligence. The Supreme Court
ruled that under these circumstances, the defendant was guilty of
nothing more than simple negligence. Because of the frequency
of errors in jury instructions in these cases, it seems proper to
quote directly from the decision the Court's ruling concerning the
words "wilful and wanton", as follows:
Under the guest statute, the facts must show more
than negligence. To wilfully and wantonly disregard the
Is 263 P. 2d 812, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 5, p. 103.
lo 271 P. 2d 1038, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 15, p. 358.
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rights of others requires a consciousness of heedless and
reckless conduct by which the safety of others is endangered. For the purpose of properly construing this statute,
ordinary or simple negligence should be considered as resulting from a passive mind, while a wilful and wanton
disregard expresses the thought that the action of which
complaint is made was the result of an active and purposeful intent. Wilful action means voluntary; by choice;
intentional; purposeful. Wantonness signifies an even
higher degree of culpability in that it is wholly disregardful of the rights, feelings and safety of others. It may,
at times, even imply an element of evil. One may be said
to be guilty of "wilful and wanton disregard" when he is
conscious of his misconduct, and although have no intent
to injure anyone, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions is aware that his conduct in the natural sequence of events will probably result in injury to his guest, and is unconcerned over the
possibility of such result. The word wanton is defined in
Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.), as:
'Marked by or manifesting arrogant recklessness of justice, of the rights or feelings of others, or the like; . . .'
Synonyms given for it are capricious, wayward, spiteful.
To be 'wilful and wanton' there must be some affirmative
act purposefully committed which the actor must have
realized as dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to consequences, or of the rights and safety of
others, particularly the guest. To be so classified, conduct must be negative in both attention and concern; it
must demonstrate indifference as well as inattention to
consequences which may result.
The foregoing is rather to be expected. In framing instructions
in these cases, however, one is confronted with a defendant who
insists that he was not conscious of the danger to others when most
certainly he should have been. All prior decisions seemed to approve the phrase "or should have known" as qualifying the defendant's consciousness of the danger. This decision qualifies, overrules, and explains the previous decisions 20 in this regard, as
follows:
As a matter of fact, the phraseology under discussion
probably has been somewhat unfortunately expressed in
our former, opinions. In view of the previous discussion
herein of the meaning of 'wilful and wanton disregard',
wherein we have tried to make plain that this represents
a condition of the mind and requires an active rather
24 See, however, Bundy v. Bien, 269 P. 2d 707, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv., Sh., No.
12, p. 279.
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than a passive mental attitude, it is impossible to say
accurately that one 'should have known'. We thereby infer that he did not know, whereas the meaning of the
terms wilful and wanton expresses the thought that he
did know. Without doubt the thought that was intended
to be conveyed in the former opinions to which reference
has been made, relates to the principle that, where, from
the surrounding facts and circumstances, the jury may
rightfully determine that a reasonably prudent person
should have known the probable result of his reckless conduct, the jury may find by inference that the defendant
did know, regardless of the fact that he himself maintains
that he did not know. It is the same principle by which
the jury is enabled in various instances to determine from
all surrounding facts and circumstances the thought that
was in the mind of a defendant at a particular time. It
is the method by which intent is determined.
In the second case (Loeffler v. Crandall)21 another young woman
sued her suitor and the Supreme Court ruled that the sharing of
expenses of a vacation trip is merely incidental and does not constitute the "moving influence for the transportation", and therefore
the passenger remains a guest for the purpose of the statute; and
also, once it is established that the plaintiff was a "guest", the
plaintiff has the burden of proof to show he has a right to recover
under the restrictions or exceptions of the Statute. In Lewis v.
Oliver,22 the Supreme Court ruled that a jury must not be instructed concerning the definition of simple negligence if the trial
court determines that the Guest Statute controls liability. The last
case, Vick v. Zumwalt,23 holds that the owner of a family car is afforded the same statutory protection as controls liability between
the plaintiff and the driver. Thus if the Guest Statute bars recovery as between the passenger and the defendant's son who was
driving the car, it also bars recovery from the parent.
These cases, in addition to considering the Guest Statute, also
the following rules of law:
1. Remarks of counsel during final argument concerning the purport of evidence not adduced at trial are
grounds for a mistrial, the offending party to pay costs,
and instructions to24the jury to disregard such remarks do
not cure the error.
2. Implied consent of a head of a household for a
member of his household to use the family automobile can
be established only by competent evidence, direct or circumstantial, which actually proves customary or continued
270 P. 2d 769, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 14, p. 319.
271 P. 2d 1055, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 15, p. 356.
1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh., No. 18, p. 470.
See Footnote 22, supra.
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use of the automobile by such member of the household,
and cannot be established merely by facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable
person to believe
25
that actual consent had been given.
3. If a trial judge recognizes the necessity of further
consideration by a jury of its verdict or answers to interrogatories and re-submits the case for further jury
deliberation, this should be done by the judge without
comment or26 emphasis on any single phase or instruction
in the case.
The last three cases, Yockey Trucking v. Handy, 7 Book v.
Paddock,28 and Siefried v. Mosher,29 had similar fact situations, in
that each involved a collision of automobiles on our state highways.
The decisions were not reached by application of tort law, but simply
affirmed jury verdicts for the plaintiffs, on the premises that all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence are drawn in favor
of the verdict by an appellate court and in favor of the other party
by a trial court when it is asked to direct a verdict. The Yockey
Trucking case further stated that this rule of law is equally applicable to those situations where the facts are undisputed, if fair
minded persons may form different opinions and draw different
conclusions from the facts.

DAMAGES, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AND LABOR LAW
WINSTON W. WOLVINGTON. of the Denver Bar
DAMAGES

In the past year, four cases involving the general question of
damages have been decided by our Supreme Court. Two of the
cases deal with the question of the substantive right to damages
and two cases deal with the question of the proper measure of
damages.
In the case of Weng v. Schleiger,' several interesting questions
of damages were determined. Mr. and Mrs. Schleiger owned an
automobile jointly. They and their minor son, John, were in the
automobile when it was struck by the defendant's truck, causing
injuries to all three and damages to the car. All three brought an
action against defendant which contained causes of action -as follows: (1) a cause of action by Mr. and Mrs. Schleiger for the damage to the automobile; (2) a cause of action by Mrs. Schleiger for
the loss of support and companionship of her husband; (3) a cause
See Footnote
See Footnote
262 P. 2d 930,
267 P. 2d 247,
268 P. 2d 411,
'273 P. 2d 356,

23, supra.
22, supra.
1953-54 C. B.
1953-54 C. B.
1953-54 C. B.
1953-54 C. B.

A. Adv. Sh.,
A. Adv. Sh.,
A. Adv. Sh.,
A, Adv. Sh.

No. 4, p. 72.
No. 9, p. 196.
No. 10, p. 218.
No. 17.

